










































Hospital investment policy in France: Pathways to efficiency and
the efficiency of the pathways
Citation for published version:
Rogers, G, Guerrero, I & Mosse, P 2009, 'Hospital investment policy in France: Pathways to efficiency and
the efficiency of the pathways' Health Policy, vol 93, no. 1, pp. 35-40. DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2009.05.013
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1016/j.healthpol.2009.05.013
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:




© Rogers, G., Guerrero, I., & Mosse, P. (2009). Hospital investment policy in France: Pathways to efficiency and
the efficiency of the pathways. Health Policy, 93(1), 35-40doi: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2009.05.013
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 28. Apr. 2017
Health Policy 93 (2009) 35–40
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Health Policy
journa l homepage: www.e lsev ier .com/ locate /hea l thpol
Hospital investment policy in France: Pathways to efﬁciency and
the efﬁciency of the pathways
Isabelle Guerreroa,∗, Philippe R. Mosséb,1, Vaughan Rogersc,2
a CR2M, University of Montpellier 2, Eugène Bataillon 34 095 Montpellier, France
b LEST-CNRS, UMR 6123, University of Aix-Marseille 35 Av J. Ferry, 13626 Aix en Provence, France
c College of Humanities and Social Science, University of Edinburgh, 59 George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9JU, United Kingdom






a b s t r a c t
Objectives: This article examines the ambivalent notion of New Public Management as
applied to health policy in France, by investigating the implementation of the efﬁciency-
driven hospital investment plan, Hôpital 2012, conceived at national level, but implemented
through regional hospital authorities (ARHs), with formal responsibility for selecting suc-
cessful funding applications.
Methods: Themethodology combines qualitative and quantitative analysis, in order to high-
light and explain discrepancies between goals and results.
Results: Despite formal adherence to objective efﬁciency indicators, certain decisions were
based on incomplete information and others on considerations outwith initially established
criteria. Competition fromtheprivate sectorwasperceivedasa threat topublichospitals and
the public sector emerged as a major beneﬁciary of the investment plan. Central ministerial
intervention emphasising ﬁnancial and quantitative considerations led the ARHs to focus
more on individual hospital performance than on wider healthcare needs.
Conclusions: Data-production became almost an end in itself, threatening to undermine
the objectives it sought to pursue. Nonetheless, extended deadlines entailed by ministerial
interventionwere appropriated as a resourceby local actors, leading toARHdecisionswhich
deviated from the ofﬁcial efﬁciency model, but resulted in increased effectiveness, taking
fuller account of local conditions.
© 2009 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Despite its reputation for ‘unreformability’, in recent
years the French hospital system has introduced numerous
principles and practices inspired by New Public Manage-
ment (NPM), representing a move away from a centrally
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directed, administrative approach, towards more decen-
tralized, managerial governance [1]. Such developments
may be seen as part of a general shift in French policy mak-
ing, with public intervention remaining prominent, but
based henceforth on a logic rooted in contractualisation,
competitive project submission, evaluation and responsi-
ble action by all protagonists, rather than plans imposed
from above [2]. However, as Peters [3] has argued, NPM is
not a theory, still less a model, but an ideology, of which
many different versions exist [4]. Consequently, speciﬁc
applications may engender trends which lead in different
directions [5], particularly in the French hospital system
where, in contrast with the United States [6], volumes
of hospital investment depend largely on national-level
0168-8510/$ – see front matter © 2009 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
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policy decisions. Research into the interplay between such
tensions and the ensuing policy results is therefore crucial
to a fuller understanding of NPM in action. To this end,
the following discussion will analyse Hôpital 2012, the
latest French hospital investment plan, in two regions,
Rhône-Alpes and Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur, in order to
identify and explain the postulated discrepancies between
the objectives of this national plan and its implementation
at regional level.
Hôpital 2012 was launched in February 2007, building
on the previous investment programme (Hôpital 2007), but
also as a new departure. Hôpital 2012 had three general
objectives: to complete the upgrading of hospital buildings
in compliance with health and safety standards; to mod-
ernise computerised hospital information systems; and to
support the restructuring measures set out in the regional
strategic healthcare plan (Schéma Régional d’Organisation
Sanitaire, SROS), drawn up by each Regional Hospital
Agency (Agence Régionale de l’Hospitalisation, ARH). How-
ever, these objectives were to be pursued within a new
framework of guiding principles, namely efﬁciency, cost
control and self-reinforcing investment through improved
productivity, placing great emphasis on results [7].
Accordingly, only 50% of the 10 billion euros devoted
to the plan was provided from National Health Insurance
(NHI) funds, via the ministerial budget for priority health-
care initiatives undertaken for the ‘general good’ (Missions
d’Intérêt Général et d’Aide à la Contractualisation, MIGAC),
administered separately from the activity-based payment
system for routine care (Tariﬁcation à l’Activité, T2A), intro-
duced in stages since 2004 to replace the ﬁxed, global
budgets hitherto allocated by the ARHs. The remaining
50% was constituted by a preferential-rate loan from the
government-supervised deposit institution, the Caisse des
Dépôts et Consignations. Each hospital seeking funding for a
project underHôpital 2012must therefore include evidence
in its application of its own resource-generating capacity
to cover 50% of the project’s costs, based on its anticipated
increase in activity and T2A-derived income. Government
funding forHôpital 2012, as stipulated in theministerial Cir-
cular of 15 June 2007 launching the plan, was devolved ex
ante to regions, in a budget mainly based on demographic
criteria, to be allocated by the ARHs, thereby enhancing
their role and inﬂuence, which had been weakened by the
introduction of the T2A.
2. Efﬁciency as a policy goal
Materials for this study were collected through the
participation of two of the present authors, as expert
advisers, in the Hôpital 2012 allocation process
with the main actors involved: the hospital policy
support team attached to the Ministry of Health (Mis-
sion Nationale d’Appui à l’Investissement Hospitalier,
MAINH) and the ARHs in Rhône-Alpes and Provence-
Alpes-Côte-d’Azur.
The collection of materials was conducted using
“grounded theory”methodology [8], combining quan-
titative and qualitative data. Analysis of qualitative
datawas carried out througha “naturalistic” approach,
seeking to understand how actors use their experience
to make decisions in complex, dynamic and real time
environments [9].
Eight ARH meetings were attended in Rhône-Alpes
and two in Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur, which had
been convened to identify all projects submitted to the
ARH by public and private hospitals in the region and
to establish the region’s priorities and eligibility crite-
ria. Numerous informal interviews were also carried
out with CEOs from the MAINH and the two ARHs.
Investment project efﬁciency was evaluated through
quantitative data analysis: economic and ﬁnancial syn-
thetic indicators were calculated for each hospital’s
written proposal. Data on public and private hospital
investment [10] in each region concernedwasobtained
from relevant websites.
This hybrid approach was designed in order to high-
light and explain the discrepancies between the goals
of Hôpital 2012 and its actual implementation by the
ARHs.
The procedure for Hôpital 2012 set a tight time frame,
with the ﬁrst selection phase opening in October 2007
and closing in November with the communication of the
accepted projects to the MAINH. The second phase was
to open on 30 April 2008 and close in October 2008. The
Circular set out the technical conditions with which indi-
vidual hospital projects (either public or private) must
comply to be selected by the ARH, and then ratiﬁed at
the national level. However, the Circular stipulated that it
was the responsibility of each ARH to select the successful
applications.
In interviews, MAINH ofﬁcials conﬁrmed that the chief
eligibility criteria for Hôpital 2012 were improved efﬁ-
ciency and compliance with the SROS, to be observed as
a collective responsibility. However, as demonstrated in
research into the concept of hospital performance [11],
the notion of efﬁciency is highly equivocal among French
hospital stakeholders. Consequently, the plan focused on
the mobilisation of all actors concerned, from the cen-
tral level, through the regional level (the ARHs, regional
NHI ofﬁcers, regional and departmental ministerial ofﬁ-
cials), to the local level (the hospitals themselves). This
highlighted the need to construct a consensus around the
criteria employed, to establish the legitimacy of the selec-
tion procedure. However, this dynamic may run counter to
administrative practices which, while pursuing the same
objectives regarding performance and equality of treat-
ment, are rooted in principles of top-down control and
adherence to formal rules [12].
2.1. An iterative approach in Rhône-Alpes
In Rhône-Alpes, an initial review of applications by
ARH ﬁeld ofﬁcers and their partners showed that 145
building-renovation projects had been submitted and 155
for information system upgrading. These meetings consid-
ered the appropriateness of each hospital’s application, in
terms of its budgetary situation and its project’s poten-
tial contribution to the needs of the area in which it was
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situated, as outlined in the SROS. While the ministerial
Circular provided for two phases in the selection process,
it was decided to commit the maximum level of funding
possible to phase One. The aim was to identify hospital
investment needs far beyond the plan itself. At these meet-
ings, information was shared between all members of the
panel in open discussion. The implementation of Hôpital
2012 representedastage inapre-establishedpolicyoffering
support and advice tohospitals,withwhich all protagonists
were familiar. The Ministry saw the plan as a kind of one-
shot policy. In contrast, local actors explicitly included the
new plan in the history of their relationships with hospital
managers and local authorities. Hence, the intrinsic quality
of an application was never considered in isolation from
what was known of its context by members of the selec-
tion panel. Ceteris paribus, a hospital supported by Hôpital
2007 would be less likely to be supported by Hôpital 2012.
Although efﬁciency imperatives ﬁgured in discussion, they
were not supported with calculations. Discussions focused
on exchanging ideas about the ﬁnancial position of each
hospital, the calibre of its director and its capacity to absorb
the increased activity entailed by the investment. These
observations collected during the meetings, conﬁrm the
existence of tacit knowledge [13]. Moreover, the situation
of the private sector, especially in those areas where chains
of private hospitals have developed a concerted strategy to
corner the market in particular specialities, raised ques-
tions concerning the legitimacy of support from public
funds. The overall perception was that, in the face of such
competition, the public service mission must be preserved,
despite (or rather because of) the abrupt decision by gov-
ernment that the T2A system must be applied at a rate of
100% from 2008. ARH ofﬁcials perceived themselves to be
in the front line of a struggle todefendpublic service values.
2.2. A sequential approach in
Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur
The Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur ARH imposed an eli-
gibility threshold represented by a minimum level of
requested funding. This threshold, introduced to compen-
sate for the absence of clear eligibility rules to eliminate
inappropriate applications, was one million euros for local
hospitals, two millions for general hospitals and private
clinics and ﬁve millions for Teaching Hospitals. This was
circulated to all hospitals from the outset and functioned as
a self-eliminating mechanism. ARH ofﬁcials estimated that
without this measure, 60 further applications would have
been received. In interviews,whenaskedabout the absence
of a threshold in Rhône-Alpes, Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur
ARH ofﬁcers argued that they utilised the plan to make
hospitals reveal their real investment needs. The aim of
Rhône-Alpes ARH ofﬁcers was to build a catalogue for use in
other circumstances, particularly the forthcoming round of
the contractualised hospital planning exercise. In contrast,
Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur ARH ofﬁcers explicitly wished
to avoid a deluge of applications and the concomitant risk
of creating expectationswhich could not be satisﬁed. These
two strategies, despite (or because of) their differences,
conﬁrm that, unlike the Ministry, both ARHs situated their
action within a long-term perspective.
The predominant view in Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur
was that support must be given to medium-sized hos-
pitals, rather than those that were too small or whose
needs were too great. Hospitals unable to ﬁnance a small
investment could not be supported, thereby reducing the
risk of a windfall effect. However, this precluded selec-
tion of low-cost projects which may have corresponded to
healthcare priorities. Whereas ARH ofﬁcials in Rhône-Alpes
regretted that tight deadlines deprived decision makers of
valuable information regarding healthcare needs, a similar
problem arising from the thresholds in Provence-Alpes-
Côte-d’Azurwasnotdiscussed.During this initial stage, ARH
Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur ofﬁcials refrained from inter-
vening directly in the preparation of applications, to avoid
compromising future rejection decisions. ARH advice was
restricted to explanations of administrative requirements
and iteration between the ARH and the hospitals was kept
to a minimum.
2.3. A coup de théâtre: the impact of the second Circular
Two months after the completion deadline for local
selection procedures and the communication of accepted
applications to Paris, the Ministry issued a second and
unexpected Circular, in order to make sure that all projects
about to be accepted at the regional level fulﬁlled the
efﬁciency criteria. The Circular stated that for projects
involving more than 10 million euros, a further document
must be completed at the beginning of 2008. This form,
which included no fewer than 10 categories and 25 sub-
categories, retrospectively requiring the supply of complex
data, conveyed an impression of distrust on the part of
the Ministry towards the work carried out by the ARHs.
Interviews with ARH CEOs demonstrated that they did not
understand the purpose of this new exercise when the
whole procedure was nearing completion. The perception
that they were being subjected to central bureaucratic con-
trol was exacerbated by ministerial responses to requests
for clariﬁcation: central administration ofﬁcials conﬁrmed
that these forms could be used to question ARH decisions.
This coup de théâtre resembledwhat Padioleau describes as
a coup d’Etat, illustrating the French central State’s compul-
sion to intervene in areas of devolved responsibility [14].
The power of local authorities is thereby jeopardized, gen-
erating the perception that actual decision-making power
remains in the hands of the central State. The destabilis-
ing impact of the second Circular was twofold. Firstly, the
information required was difﬁcult to collect in the time
available and did not always appear pertinent to the objec-
tives. Secondly, despite the interval between the trial and
the publication of the second Circular, little account had
been taken of the comments from the ARHs concerned,
which sought to simplify the procedure and integrate the
attempts alreadymadeby theARHs to clarify their rationale
in the selection process.
In Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur, ARH staff could not
assemble the required data in the time allowed, without
calling upon the services of the hospitals concerned. This
technical necessity undermined the linear approach hith-
erto adopted by the ARH in its relations with the hospitals,
withwhichcomplexexchangesof informationnowbecame
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necessary. During this process, the ARH asked several hos-
pitals to revise their projects by breaking them down into
functional segments, to reduce the pressures generated by
demand.
In Rhône-Alpes, uncertainty regarding the purpose of
the exercise was exacerbated when it transpired that most
of the data required was already available. Secondly, it
increased scope for an ‘auction effect’, where the involve-
ment of local politicians, with an interest in the sensitive
issue of hospital investment, can lead to commitments of
variable ofﬁcial status, running counter to policy choices
made at the central and local levels, based on technical
or economic considerations. This phenomenon was inten-
siﬁed by the fact that the episode of the second Circular
coincided with the municipal election campaign of March
2008.3
3. Efﬁciency as rhetoric in the selection process
In Rhône-Alpes, 145 projects (representing 3 billion
euros in total) were submitted in the building-renovation
category, of which 35 were retained for further considera-
tion. 24% of bidswere therefore successful, but represented
77%of the total sumof all applications. Successful bidswere
therefore those involving the largest ﬁnancial sums, consis-
tent with the decision to maximise funds devoted to phase
One.
The acceptance rate varied markedly between sectors,
as the public sector made 49% of successful applications, as
against 31% for the private, not-for-proﬁt sector, while pri-
vate, commercial hospitals submitted 10% of bids accepted.
The correlation between this result and the discussions
in the preliminary review is particularly noteworthy. The
public sector submitted 47% of the total number of applica-
tions, representing76%of theirﬁnancial value, as compared
with 40% and 15% respectively for the private, commer-
cial sector. Public-sector applications thus represented
an unexpectedly high ﬁnancial value and not-for-proﬁt
hospitals occupied an intermediate position with 13% of
applications, representing 9% of overall ﬁnancial value.
The data base supplied by the Rhône-Alpes ARH
reveals the reasons for the rejection of building-renovation
projects at this stage. In 50% of cases, rejection was due
to non-compliance with the criteria laid down by the Min-
istry (insufﬁcient conformitywithhealth and safety factors,
inadequate evidence of a 50% self-ﬁnancing capacity). 25%
of applications were rejected through insufﬁcient data or
inadequate return on investment guarantees. 20% of appli-
cations were rejected because the same (or a similar)
project had received funding under Hôpital 2007.
Applications in the Information Systems category rep-
resented less than 5% of the total number of submissions,
but 85% of these were successful. The public sector was
again the main beneﬁciary, with a success rate of almost
100%, representing 69% of the total number of applications
accepted and 72% of the total value of applications.
3 Until 2009, the mayor of the City was, by law, the chairperson of the
public hospital board (Conseil d’administration).
Following extensive consultation, 34 projects were still
in the running for ﬁnal selection at the beginning of this
stage. To facilitate selection, a supplementary document
was compiled by theARH, dividing these projects into three
categories: (a) for later consideration; (b) falling outside
criteria; (c) eligible.
We analysed these 34 remaining projects, according to
eight indicators selected from the model drawn up by the
MAINH. These concerned two debt-related indicators, two
investment-related indicators and four project-efﬁciency
indicators, of which the most signiﬁcant estimated total
gains from the project, against total investment expendi-
ture. Our ﬁndings showed that, of the 11 highest-ranking
projects according to this indicator, only four corresponded
to the projects ﬁnally accepted by the ARH. Furthermore,
information had been inappropriately recorded regarding
return on investment data and projected income levels,
which were considered irrelevant for Rehabilitative or
Mental Health care, since the T2A system did not apply to
these activities. Ultimately, certain decisions were based
on incomplete information and others on considerations
outwith the criteria initially established.
Exploring further the comparison between the theoret-
ical criteria and actual results through a general typology,
we constructed a synthetic indicator based on the afore-
mentioned eight efﬁciency criteria. Applications were
thereby divided into three groups. The ﬁrst comprises
the highest performing applications, the second, those of
average efﬁciency and the third, the least efﬁcient. The
typology also differentiates between applications accepted
or rejected at this stage.
Table 1 reveals that 50% of successful applications
in Rhône-Alpes belong to the intermediate group, which
is entirely consistent with the ‘philosophy’ applied in
. . . Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur! According to that region’s
rationale, the plan should support projects within hospi-
tals of average size and ﬁnancial health, but in reality, the
same logic objectively, but not explicitly, also prevailed in
Rhône-Alpes.
The acceptance of twoprojects from the third group also
invites comment. On a methodological level, data provided
by both hospitals involved was incomplete, as details for
three of the four project-efﬁciency indicators were miss-
ing. The ﬁrst project concerned a Mental Healthcare public
hospital, to which projected income from activity-based
payments did not therefore apply, but which was accorded
priority because of the infrastructure renovation and man-
agerial improvements it involved. The second concerned
the paediatric emergency unit in a private hospital, also
involving a merger with another private hospital on a new
site.
Table 1
Ranking of projects submitted to the Rhône-Alpes ARH.




(1) High efﬁciency 11 3
(2) Average efﬁciency 8 5
(3) Low efﬁciency 6 2
Totals 25 10
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In Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur, only 65 applicationswere
received in the building-renovation category in September,
of which 22 were rejected at the preliminary review, 18
deferred to the second phase and 25 retained for further
consideration. This initial selection was carried out accord-
ing to 28 criteria, divided into three categories (Medicine
andHealthcare, Economics andFinance, ConstructionEngi-
neering) and a small panel of approximately three people
was constituted for each category. The ARH subsequently
circulated an explanatory table, showing fourmain reasons
for its rejection decisions: (a) internal restructuring with
little impact on provision of care, as outlined in SROS (six
cases); (b) supplementary work to an operation already
funded (six cases); (c) health and safety improvements
which should be undertaken routinely (10 cases, all private
sector); (d) level of investment below regional threshold
(eight cases).
Out of the 25 building-renovation applications still eli-
gible, only eight were ﬁnally selected. Although in several
départements the private sector submitted more projects
than the public sector, the only successful private-sector
applications were in the Information Systems category.
Moreover, despite ARH encouragement for information-
pooling systems, 70% of the funding was devoted to two
public hospitals. The eligibility threshold of two million
euros for the private sector thus operated as an automatic
elimination mechanism. In addition, as in Rhône-Alpes, the
perception of the private sector as a threat to public hospi-
tals, especially those of medium size and in average ﬁnan-
cial health, represented a major factor in ﬁnal decisions.
4. Results and discussion: from procedures to
processes
Four main results emerge from the study, each of which
gives rise to discussion.
4.1. Time management
The disruption caused by the second Circular, with
its new deadline, was appropriated by local actors and
allowed hospitals to continue reﬁning their applications
from November 2007 until January 2008. Nonetheless, the
continuing perception of the ARHs was that the projects
submitted to the MAINH would conform closely to the
expectations of theMinistry. Ultimately, the projectswhich
emerged from the second selection phase differed signiﬁ-
cantly fromthose selected inNovember.Notonlyhaderrors
and inconsistencies crept in, but the contenthadbeenmod-
iﬁed.
These interlocking processes illustrate the classic oppo-
sition between the exigencies of close-quarter regulation
and those of coordination fromadistance [15].Whereas the
latter requires relatively standardised instruments, the for-
mer relies on the development of relations based on time,
trust andﬂexibility. In a contextwhere procedures giveway
to processes, these two modes of regulation may coexist
in a mutually antagonistic relationship, even neutralising
each other. This tension was reinforced from the outset by
the method through which funding was allocated to the
regions.
4.2. The private–public issue
In both regions, the public sector emerged as a major
beneﬁciary of the investment plan. The polarisation of
Hôpital 2012 towards the defence of public service values
was reinforcedby thecooperationdynamic, since this inter-
action andmost of the selection process took placewithin a
professional milieu dominated by such values, rather than
market-related considerations. Two other developments
reinforced this trend: intensifying competition from pow-
erful private hospital chains and the extension of the T2A
system, perceived as a threat.
4.3. Little consideration of health needs
The Ministry’s emphasis on ﬁnancial and quantitative
data in the second Circular led the ARHs to focus on indi-
vidual applications, without relating their decisions to a
declared regional policy rationale. Yet, in this conﬁgura-
tion, producing the ‘right’ information becomes a major
legitimacy issue, since rationalisation involves revealing
the information upon which decisions are based [16]. The
procedure adopted led all protagonists to consider that
the relevant data was ﬁnancial and held by the hospitals,
resulting in a two-way misunderstanding. Further com-
plexitywas engendered by the persistence of ‘cross-cutting
regulation’, represented in the hospital system by direct
links between the hospitals and the Ministry, which by-
pass intermediary bodies and assessment of healthcare
needs.
4.4. The questionable efﬁciency of procedure
The shift from procedure to process also produced posi-
tive effects on the quality of selection. The appropriation
of the procedure by the ARHs, in cooperation with the
hospitals, allowed them to improve the presentation and
content of certain projects. Ultimately, what amounted to a
second round in the selection process facilitated the selec-
tion of approximately 10highest-ranking applications from
those still eligible. In Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur, projects
deferred to the second phase became eligible for the ﬁrst,
due to the division into operational segments. Others took
the opportunity to adjust the level of funding requested
to ﬁt actual needs. Despite the policy learning experience,
the perception of ofﬁcials in both ARHs was that their
‘political room for manoeuvre’ had been limited to decid-
ing between a few applications which all corresponded
to major healthcare priorities and that, had the procedure
been simpler and quicker, itwould have produced the same
results.
5. Conclusion
The divergence between anticipated results based on
the formal criteria of the plan and the actual results of the
selection process carried out by the ARHs is highly signif-
icant. It is explicable in terms of the managerial latitude
forged by the ARHs in relation to the initial procedure and
underpinned by a different, but equally legitimate, eco-
nomic logic. When efﬁciency becomes almost synonymous
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with the capacity to generate increasing volumes of tech-
nical information, data-production may become an end in
itself, threatening to undermine the objectives it seeks to
pursue. As an instance of NPM in action, the implemen-
tation of Hôpital 2012 highlights the tensions generated
by the competition between these different kinds of logic.
Through a mixture of deliberate strategy and unplanned
responses to such tensions, the ARHs became pivotal actors
in the implementation process. Using the time factor as a
resource, the ARHs overcame threats to their own legit-
imacy, making policy choices which deviated from the
ofﬁcial efﬁciency model, but led to increased effectiveness,
taking fuller account of local conditions.
The recommendations to be made from a health policy
perspective are fourfold.
First, as the policy is decentralized, control by state
administration should be exerted a-posteriori, rather than
a-priori, since the efﬁcacy of a multi-level policy depends
upon trust between the actors at the different levels.
Second, decentralized policy needs to associate decen-
tralized bodies not only in policy implementation but also
in the whole policy-making process.
Third, accountability and reporting are key issues. Our
study shows that the more straightforward the procedure,
the more accurate its results will be. When economic per-
formance is an imperative, reducing the number of criteria
increases procedure efﬁciency and contributes to clarifying
the policy rationale.
Fourth, the time factor is essential for health policy
setting, inwhich evaluationmust be continuous and cumu-
lative.
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